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INSTITUTION THEORY AND NEW AGENDAS 
 
Since the 1970s public administration  institutions as a  research domain  has increasingly 
opened up to contributions from other social sciences such as history, political science and 
sociology of organizations. It has become less normative and more empirical, considering 
institutions as dependent variables as well as autonomous actors. 
  New schools of thought have emerged in academic circles. Institutional theory is a label 
that oversimplifies the fact that such schools are not exactly alike:  they do not share the 
same agenda. The present chapter presents four of such streams: historical institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism, new institutionalism, and local order or actor institutionalism. 
Each develops a more or less specific set of theoretical as well as empirically grounded 
interpretations.  Each  also  covers  major  facets  of  what  institutionalization  processes  are. 
Political and administrative machineries experience path dependencies. They are embedded 
in societal environments. They function like specific social systems. They produce social 
norms  and  cognitive  references.  Therefore  interactions  between  societal  change  and 
administrative reform become  key issues. 
 
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Historical institutionalism as a theoretical stream emerged in the early 1980s (Hall, 1986) 
and  labeled  as  such  later  (Steinmo  et  al.,  1992).  This  perspective  defines  public 
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functions as a undifferentiated whole and as a passive agent. Why are resources and power 
allocated unequally by the public sector? The essence of politics is = competition for scarce 
resources between groups and issues. It looks much more like a complex set of differentiated 
institutions,  as  underlined  by  neo-marxist  (Katzenstein,  1978;  Evans e t  a l . ,  1985),  neo-
corporatist (Anderson, 1979) and organizational theorists (Dupuy and Thoenig, 1985). The 
UK Treasury, for instance, is fragmented into several policy communities, each gathering 
public  servants  and  private  associations  who  share  convergent  views  or  are  involved  in 
common problem handling (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974). 
  Historical institutionalism considers that outcomes of public policies do not just reflect 
the preferences or interests of the strongest social forces. They are also channeled by existing 
and past arrangements. Policy choices made in the past shape choices made today. Political 
and administrative organizations, conventions and procedures regulating the relationships 
between economic actors and the state, are therefore path-dependent. Radical and voluntary 
changes in public administration are to a large extent a hopeless endeavor in such contexts. 
Existing institutions structure the design and the content of the decisions themselves.  
  Institutional contexts differ from one country to another, for instance in  the real power 
of the judiciary: this models divergent preferences and interpretations of action by the labor 
movement organizations (Hattam, 1993). Comparative international approaches, combining 
in-depth study and longitudinal research, provide a rich set of counter-intuitive observations. 
They also bring political conflict and social dissent back in, studying a variety of settings in 
which collective action implies interactions between the public sector and society at large. 
Some  public  agencies  have  more  influence  than  others.  They  also  use  loosely  coupled 
procedures that may contradict or conflict. Other institutions such as trade unions, economic 
associations  of  employers  or  of  farmers  may  also  generate  public  order  and  political 
legitimacy (Rose and Davies, 1994). Historical and comparative lenses observe that public 
institutions influence administrative and socio-political players in two  major ways. They 
offer some degree of predictability about the issues discussed. And they also define models 
of behaviors and sets of protocols that are rather stereotyped and ready for immediate use. In 
other terms public agencies provide moral and cognitive frameworks allowing their own 
members,  as  well  as  third  parties.  to  make  sense  of  events  and  to  act  in  specific 








































1  3 
preferences of administrative and political elites. 
  The implications of such findings are hardly  irrelevant.. Institutional designs do not 
reflect intentionality. Criteria used at the time when public policies and organizations were 
initially  designed  rapidly  vanish.  Political  stakes  and  coalition  games  take  over  and 
determine  outcomes.  A  model  of  punctuated  equilibrium  posits  that  public  institutions 
simply respond to changes in the external power balance within society (Krasner, 1984).  
  While  older  forms  of  institutionalism  postulated  that  institutions  shape  policies  and 
politics, historical or longitudinal approaches underline the fact that politics and policies 
shape institutions. Public institutions are taken for granted and provide the infrastructure for 
collective action. Acquiring the status of social conventions, they are never questioned. As 
social constructs, they resist any incremental change or any reform made by any single actor 
(Graftstein, 1992). 
  Although  the  logic  of  path  dependence  and  persistence  are  central  to  the  historical 
institutionalism,  developments  in  this  approach  have  tended  to  include  change  more 
effectively.    Historical  institutionalism  did  include  a  means  for  large-scale  change—the 
concept of “punctuated equilibrium”.  For example, the work of Streeck and Thelen (2005) 
demonstrates how more gradual changes can alter institutions while maintaining many of the 
fundamental aspects of those institutions. 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Selznick;s study of the Tennessee Valley Authority was a pioneering step in the sociological 
institutionalism perspectives. (Selznick 1948, 1949).  
  Public agencies as organizations are considered as institutional actors in as far as their 
field  units  appropriate  and  promote  values  and  interests  that  are  embedded  in  the  local 
communities in which they operate, and not just as machines implementing goals and values 
defined by a principal.   
  A first lesson is that incongruities may exist between the declared ends and those that 
the  agency  actually  achieves  or  seeks  to  achieve.  It  pursues  self-support  and  self-
maintenance goals, as well as productive ends. It turns into a polymorphous system whose 
struggle to survive induces it to neglect or to distort its goals. Public bureaucracies possess a 








































1  4 
solely in accordance with their assigned roles. Therefore public management is not limited to 
the  art  of  designing  formalized  structures,  but  t  also  consider  the  way  participants  are 
influenced, transformed and completed by informal structures. What happens at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, in grass root-level units, matters a lot, in some cases even more than what 
happens  at  the  top..  A  public  bureaucracy  must  cope  with  the  constraints  and  pressures 
applied by the outside local context in which it operates.  
  A  second  lesson  is  that  institutionalization  involves  processes  through  which  the 
members  of  an  agency  acquire  values  that  go  beyond  the  technical  requirements  of 
organizational tasks. No organization is completely free of values.  ‘To institutionalize is to 
infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’ (Selznick, 1957: 
17). It is induced by selective recruiting of personnel, by establishing strong ties or alliances 
with outside groups through processes such as implicit alliances, sharing common values or 
cooptation  of  local  partners.  Thick  institutionalization  is  achieved  when  some  rules  or 
procedures are sanctified, when some units or members of the public agency become semi-
autonomous centers of power and develop their own vested interests, when administrative 
rituals, symbols and ideologies exist. Public institutions develop in a gradual manner. They 
become valued by their members and by outside vested interests for the special place they 
hold in society 
  The real birth or revival of sociological institutionalism occurred in fact about 40 years 
later (Meyer and Scott, 1983). It endorses some hypotheses already suggested by Selznick. 
Organizations must cope with the constraints and pressures applied by contexts in which 
they operate. Nevertheless it also suggests alternative approaches.  
While  Selznick  emphasized  processes  such  as  group  conflict  and  cooptation  of  external 
constituencies, the new generation of sociologists downplays their importance. It underlines 
the importance of constraints such as conformity and legitimacy imperatives. It also locates 
irrationality in the formal structure itself, not only in informal interactions such as influence 
patterns.  
  While Selznick favored a meso-level perspective and studied a single public agency, the 
Stanford school is more macro-oriented and hyper-deterministic: ideologies and values that 
are dominant at a societal level or global level induce institutional uniformity at the meso 
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– are studied to test how they are shaped by external values. The field is examined as a 
whole, as an activity making rules, and defines an institutional context within which each 
single organization plots its courses of action: sets of public art museums (DiMaggio, 1991), 
private and public elementary schools, health care programs (Scott and Meyer, 1994).  
   Compared to historical institutionalism, the sociological perspective defines institutional 
broadly.  Beside  formal  rules  and  procedures,  it  includes  symbols,  moral  models,  and 
cognitive schemes. Institutions provide frames of meaning which guide human action and 
therefore  are  similar  to  cultural  systems.  Institutionalization  is  a  cognitive  process  that 
models the sense people give to events or acts.  Institutionalized  myths  are  central  to 
explanation. Formal structures should be understood as composed  of myths and ceremonies 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977), influencing the conduct of public administrators not only by 
influencing what they have to do, but also by shaping the imagination of the actors about 
alternatives and solutions. Society or culture as a whole determines the acts and non-acts, the 
structures and the values of the public sector.  
   Many organizations, whether public or private, adopt formal structures, procedures and 
symbols  that  appear  identical.  Diffusion  processes  are  characterized  by  institutional 
isomorphic  change  (DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983).  Mechanisms  such  as  coercive 
isomorphism – change results from pressures exerted by political influence or by outside 
organizations considered as legitimate – mimetic isomorphism – uncertainty and ambiguity 
about goals or technology increases the  adoption of imitation conducts  – and normative 
isomorphism  –  the  influence  of  individuals  belonging  to  the  same  profession  or  having 
followed the same educational processes-- accelerate similarities. Designing institutions that 
are radically different from the existing ones becomes an illusion in a world that constrains 
autonomy of choice and limits action-oriented imagination. 
  Public  organizations,  therefore  prefer  not  to  be  innovative    because  conformity 
reinforces their political legitimacy or improves the social image of their members. Values 
recognized by their environment drive transformation more than instrumental rationalities 
increasing  efficiency  or  effectiveness.  In  the  long  term,  more  diversity  or  competition 
between alternative organizational models is possible. (Kondra and Hinings, 1998). 
  To  explain  radical  organizational  transformation,  the  concept  of  archetype  is  used 








































1  6 
orientation  or  underlying  interpretative  scheme.  Evolutionary  change  occurs  slowly  and 
gradually,  as  a  fine-tuning  process  within  the  parameters  of  an  existing  archetype 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Organizational change may also happen  swiftly and affect 
all the parts of the organization simultaneously. It is associated with interactions between 
exogenous dynamics – or institutional contexts – and endogenous interests, values and power 
dependencies.  Pressures  for  change  are  precipitated  under  two  conditions.  Inside,  group 
dissatisfaction with accommodation of interests within the existing template for organizing 
are coupled with  values. Outside public agencies, exogenous dynamics exist,  pushing for an 
alternative template. Deinstitutionalization processes occur (Oliver, 1992), in which practices 
erode  or face discontinuity or rejection over time. 
 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
New institutionalism as an explicit school of thought finds its origins in a paper published by 
two political scientists (March and Olsen, 1984).  
     Government is in the business of forming its environments, not adapting to it. Public 
administration is driven by societal visions and political projects. Therefore organizations 
that handle public affairs should be ‘conceptualized as institutions rather than as instruments’ 
(Brunsson and Olsen, 1997: 20). They generate and implement prescriptions that define how 
the  game  is  played.  Who  is  a  legitimate  participant?  What  are  the  acceptable  agendas? 
Which sanctions should be applied in case of deviations? Which processes would be able to 
induce actual changes? The way people think, interpret facts, act and cope with conflicts are 
influenced and simplified by public administration. Do public administration reforms match 
societal needs? And do they also help and enhance democratic participation? 
  New institutionalism considers dangerous the very idea that it is possible to reform and 
control public organizations top down and with a technocratic style. Social science research 
has  to  make  explicit  the  less  than  convincing  axioms  or  hypotheses  underlying  and 
legitimizing  reforms.    New  Public  Management  approaches,  for  instance,  are  based  on 
widely  accepted  postulates  inspired  by  neo-liberal  economics  -  rational  choice,  agency 
theory  -  and  that  are  supposedly  generally  relevant,.  Contextualism  is  a  perspective 
stipulating that politics is a component of society -- the mere product of factors such as 
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mere consequences of individual behaviors: the functioning of a public agency is explainable 
by  the  behavior  model  of  the  single  bureaucrat.    Economic  utilitarianism  implies  that 
conducts  of  individuals  are  basically  driven  by  their  own  selfish  interest.  Functionalist 
approaches adopt Darwinian views: historical evolution selects the organizational forms that 
fit the environmental requirements and kills those that do not. An instrumental perspective 
claims that the core role political life fulfills is to allocate scarce resources and that it is 
therefore legitimate to rationalize the criteria of choice governments and budgets use. 
  The founders of new institutionalism suggest alternative ideas or hypotheses to such 
perspectives. They question how far organized action can be planned the product of design 
or  authoritarian  will,  and  to  what  degree  some  public  order  is  achievable  in  pluralistic 
societies. Public institutions may experience a large degree of autonomy and follow logics of 
their  own,  independently  of  outside  influences  or  requirements.  The  historical  process 
happens to select organizational forms that are not always efficient. Symbols, myths and 
rituals have more impact upon political and administrative events than immediate, narrow 
and selfish economic or power interests. 
  In other terms the logic of consequentiality is an illusion. Action in organizations is not 
to any great extent instrumentally oriented, and only bounded rationality is available. Public 
administrators make decisions according to some criterion of satisficing. They make trade-
offs between the content of the problem they address and the level of uncertainty they face in 
real time. 
  In  order  to  understand  how  policy-making  really  is  processed  and  handled  inside 
organizations, new institutionalism provides an analytic grid. Empirical observation should 
consider three fundamental dimensions or aspects: the goals the various units pursue, the 
way information, opportunities and support are mobilized for action taking, and the choice of 
decisions  processes  at  work.  It  should  identify  how  far  in  a  given  action  set  four  main 
mechanisms  may  exist:  conflict  avoidance  behaviors,  uncertainty  reduction  processes, 
problem  solving  as  solutions  seeking  and  finding  initiators,  and  organizational  learning 
dynamics through former experience and rules of attention allocation. 
In fact public organizations function like political arenas. Power issues and power games 
model  their  functioning  and  their  policies.  Collective  goals  do  not  necessarily  exist  that 
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Therefore institutional devices are needed in order to channel opportunistic behaviors and 
ensure some collective stability. 
  Two basic socialization mechanisms make behaviors more predictable, provided that 
they  channel  the  potential  risk  factor  human  behaviors  represent.  One  is  induced  by 
organizational routines and by the presence of pre-existing institutions. As underlined by 
organizational sciences, actors select their conducts according to a logic of appropriateness 
or conformism (March and Olsen, 1989). The implication is that routines or legacies from 
the past are powerful sources of integration, and create risk-adverse conditions for collective 
action.  A  second    is  generated  by  cognitive  patterns  and  values  that  are  diffused  along 
institutionalization processes. Action mobilizes cultural elements used as frameworks by the 
various  stakeholders.  Actors  fulfill  identities  by  following  rules  that  they  imagine  as 
appropriate to the situation they face and are involved in.  
  New  institutionalism  suggests  a  theory  of  learning  in  ambiguous  environments.  It 
predicts and explains how and why in a specific action context individuals and organizations 
try to reach some degree of understanding of the context they face (March and Olsen, 1975). 
It analyzes why each of them allocates attention, or not, to a particular subject at a given 
time, and studies how information is collected and exploited (March and Olsen, 1976). 
  This platform  gave birth in 1988 to a research consortium involving American and 
Scandinavian  scholars.  More  than  thirty  field  studies  were  conducted  on  public  sector 
organizations, especially in Sweden and Norway (Christensen and Lægreid, 1998b). Reforms 
of  various  kinds  were  observed,  such  as  introducing  corporate  strategic  planning  in  the 
relationships  between  the  national  government  and  state  agencies,  running  a  public  rail 
company in a decentralized way and with a strong market orientation, or introducing a three-
year budgeting methodology into national government administration and setting up active 
and  participative  county  councils  (Brunsson  and  Olsen,  1997).  Social  scientists  retained 
interest  in  phenomena  such  as  national  administrative  reform  policy  (Christensen  and 
Lægreid,  1998a),  complex  public  building  projects  (Sahlin-Andersson,  1998), 
decentralization  policies  in  municipalities  (Czarniawska  and  Joerges,  1998),  constitutive 
reforms of the European Union (Blichner and Sangolt, 1998), municipal accounting reforms 
(Bergeværn et al., 1998) or central government officials (Egeberg and Sætren, 1999). 
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  In this view, public management is the consequence of human activities, not the result 
of applied techniques. Contrary to what most New Public Management supporters advocate, 
leaders are not  in full control, organizations are not passive, and policy choices  are not 
consensual. Actual administrative reforms, whether successful or not, are characterized by a 
low degree of simplicity and clarity. Normativity, which should bring order into chaotic 
reality, is somewhat lacking. No one-sidedness allows a single set of values to be accepted as 
legitimate. Many promises are made about the future. Nevertheless the instant production of 
results is irrelevant. Public administration organizations cannot be controlled and changed 
through  pure  thought  based  on  a  so-called  abstract  rationality.  It  is  easy  to  initiate 
administrative reforms, but few are completed (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). Reformers are 
prisoners of walls that are to a large extent mental. 
  Reforms generate more reforms and induce fewer  changes and  become routinized. 
Organizational forgetfulness allows acceleration of reforms and helps people accept them. 
Top-down reforms should be avoided because their relationship with change outcomes is 
problematic. They paradoxically contribute to stability and prevent change from occurring. 
  While actual organizational changes are not generated by planned or comprehensive 
reform, observation suggests that they are abundant. Public administrations as such are not 
innovation-adverse, but may follow a sequence of transformations reflecting outside factors 
such as labor market dynamics or inside initiatives informally taken by low-ranking units. 
Major changes when they happen occur without much prior thought and discussion. It is also 
easier  to  generate  them  when  reforms  are  undertaken  in  non-controversial  areas.  Hotly 
debated issues are not subjected to any great change. 
  Normative institutionalism suggests two main prescriptions for public administration 
changes  to  occur.  There  should  be  a  match  between  rules,  identities  and  situations: 
successful  reforms  are  culturally  sensitive.  And  local  context  matter  because  they  are 
diverse: importing so-called good practices, mere imitation, are questionable in terms of 
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INSTITUTIONS  AS  CO-CONSTRUCTED  LOCAL 
ORDERS  
 
Are institutional theories able to provide a general theory? So-called critical theories, for 
instance,  use  approaches  inspired  by  sociological  and  historical  institutionalisms  as 
substitutes for neo-marxist interpretations of globalization, as if global or macro factors at 
work at societal levels would determine any kind of meso or local evolution, including in 
public administration. Skepticism also abounds about the capacity of new institutionalism to 
give a grounded analysis of the actual functions and latent roles public bureaucracies fulfill 
in modern societies and polities.  
  Revisiting the institutional character of public administration, some alternative schools 
of thought, in particular in Europe, t mix organizational theory inputs with more action-
oriented lenses inspired by research practices applied to policy making.    
For  instance  a  research  program  called  actor-centered  institutionalism  was  developed  in 
Germany in the 1970s and 1980s by  a sociologist of organization who had studied policy 
implementation processes, and who was joined by a political scientist interested in game 
theory (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995). In their opinion, institutional factors are not as such 
direct causes of public practices and norms. They provide negotiation arenas and interaction 
resources between corporative actors, whether public or private. Various action and actor 
constellations  exist  in  real  life  to  handle  collective  issues,  as  numerous  studies  on  the 
European Union and Germany underline this (Mayntz et al., 1988), demonstrating that more 
importance should be given to collective action and political bargaining contexts at meso 
levels.   
  French scholars addressed the question of of how far local orders really matter, not only 
at an international or at a national level, but also at the level of specific organizations or local 
components. Are institutions as global paradigms able to impose recurrently, a similar set of 
values  and  action  processes  across  societies?  Sociologists  and  political  scientists  were 
influenced by policy analysis inquiry as developed on both sides of the Atlantic. The idea 
that  public  institutions  may  have  a  thickness  of  their  own  inside  societies  and  polities 
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organisations.  It  considers  institutional  phenomena  as  both  independent  and  dependent 
variables, as resources, constraints or stakes for the actors involved. Bureaucratic change 
processes are used as heuristic entry points. 
  While it is true that bureaucracies are modeled by societal factors such as the education 
system, national culture patterns or social stratification (Crozier, 1963), that a few corps of 
public servants trained in exclusive schools such as the ENA and the Ecole Polytechnique 
control  the  public  agenda  of  a  whole  country  (Suleiman,  1978)  or  that  they  shape  in  a 
monopolistic  way  major  policies  they  shall  also  implement  themselves  (Thoenig,  1987), 
empirical research suggests that, below the surface, the functioning of public bureaucracies 
may differ quite markedly. Local orders exist which create heterogeneities in space. In a 
nation-state  such  as  France,  whose  founding  values  incorporate  the  ideals  of  unity  and 
equality, and where enforcement is centralized and authoritarian manner, public institutions 
are  not  alike  and  their  bureaucracies  function  in  a  centrifugal  manner,  inducing  highly 
differentiated outcomes across the territory and society.   
  Local orders matter in administration.   Mutual socialization occurs, such a process of 
cooptation having already been explored by Selznick in his study of TVA. State prefects 
think  and  act  like  advocates  of  the  interests  of  their  respective  geographic  and  social 
jurisdiction.  Mayors  behave  as  brokers  between  the  state  and  their  constituents.  Local 
agencies of the national ministries are strongly embedded in sub-national communities. They 
get legitimacy from their environment, especially from local elected politicians. It becomes a 
resource they use to increase their autonomy in  relationship with their headquarters in Paris. 
Informal and stable relation patterns link state agencies to specific environments such as 
local political and economic leaders (Crozier and Thoenig, 1976).  
  Public governance all across France is structured by which is very different from the 
hierarchical model and which ignores formal division of power between national and local 
authorities. The machinery of the central state looks like a fragmented organizational fabric: 
its various subparts cooperate less than each of them cooperates with local environment 
leaders  (Hayward  and  Wright,  2002).  Such  cross-regulation  practices  develop  between 
partners who otherwise perceive each other as antagonistic. They give birth and legitimacy to 
implicit rules of exchange and to stable interest coalitions with tacit arrangements set during 
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arrangements  negotiated  locally.  A  secondary  norm  of  implementation,  which  varies 
according  to  time  and  space  and  which  is  perceived  as  legitimate,  prevails  over  formal 
conformism and of equality of treatment. State agencies generate exceptions and derogations 
become local norms. Local polities and politics are shaped in two ways. Bureaucratic ways 
of doing things more broadly model the cognitions and the expectations of social groups. 
  Public institutions are just one partner among many who intervene in public affairs. 
This clearly is  the case for  regulative policies applied by the state  machinery to  freight 
transportation  (Dupuy  and  Thoenig,  1979)  or  to  agricultural  affairs  (Jobert  and  Müller, 
1988).  Eeach  policy  domain  has  a  specific  system  of  organized  action  and  functions 
according to own logic. Even when some ministry in Paris or some regional public body may 
play a hegemonic role, its acts and non-acts remain dependent on the presence of other 
public agencies, firms or voluntary associations. Policy outcomes are highly dependant on 
initiatives taken by firms or from attention allocated by groups of citizens. At least four 
different types of functioning seem to co-exist in the French public sphere at large: inward-
oriented bureaucracies, environment-sensitive institutions, outward-driven organizations, and 
inter-organizational systems (Thoenig, 1996). 
  Public  administrations  also  experiences  dramatic  changes.  Central  state  agencies  no 
longer play a dominant role, governing national as well as local public affairs through the 
allocation  of  subsidies  and  the  elaboration  of  technical  rules.  A  different  political  and 
administrative  system  emerging  since  the  decentralization  launched  in  the  early  1980s. 
resulted in massive transfers from the central state to regional and local authorities (Thoenig, 
2005). New private, associative or public players, such as the European Commission, get a 
role  in  policy  making.  Public  issues  coincide  less  and  less  with  the  way  sub-national 
territories are subdivided and administrative jurisdictions defined. Collective problems are 
horizontal and are provide uncertain solutions. Cross-regulation gives poor results when the 
challenge is to identify the nature of collective problems and to set public agendas. State 
agencies adopt another political integration approach: constitutive policies. New institutional 
frameworks coordinate the views and mindsets of multiple partners, make them speak a 
common language and share a common perception about what to do, how, when and for 
whom. Facing a polity that is fragmented, active and non-consensual, a weakened state uses 
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  Interdependent phenomena are interpreted as results of strategic behaviors of actors 
operating in power settings. Social regulation – how different actors establish normative 
arrangements and make their respective logics of action compatible – is  key to empirical 
analysis.  
  While new institutionalism perspectives favor a vision of democratic order in which 
responsibility is a consequence of the institution of the individual, citizens are free, equal and 
discipline-oriented agents, and governance is enlightened and rule-constrained (Olsen, 1998), 
their  continental  colleagues  are  more  pessimistic.  They  adopt  a  rather  cynical  or 
Machiavellian vision of politics.  Public institutions are political devices. The essence of 
politics is power, and individuals behave in an opportunistic way. 
  Public institutions are action-oriented systems. As specific social arrangements, they are 
fragile  constructs  because  they  are  the  non-intended  outcomes  of  permanent  collective 
tinkering. Discontinuities in time characterize the essence of public administration and of 
societal order.  The  state  is  more  collective  and  pluralistic:  public  institutions  have  no 
monopoly on public problems and their government. Public affairs are co-constructed.  
  Public  organizations  should  also  be  considered  as  local  social  orders,  as  meso  or 
intermediary  social  configurations,  which  are  neither  passive  nor  intentional,  but  are 
constantly  reconstructed  in  terms  of  social  norms  and  of  membership.  For  instance,  the 
emergence of international standards used as benchmarks for the production of goods, is 
argued  to  be  a  form  of  control  as  important  as  hierarchies  and  markets.  People  and 
organizations all over the world seem to follow the same standards (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 
2000). For instance, public institutions operating in higher education and research and facing 
the challenge of international rankings may hardly ignore these standards. A common global 
order is emerging. Not joining it – not fitting the criteria of academic quality set up by 
evaluators – is suicidal. Such a global process toward homogeneity is nevertheless far from 
being obvious or irreversible. Single universities have alternative options at their disposal to 
make  it  in  the  competition,  many  of  them  producing  themselves  or  endogenously  local 











































1  14 
CONCLUSION 
Institutional theories streams have become leading and widely shared references in public 
administration (Frederickson 1999). Because they consider public institutions through three 
different lenses - as pillars of political order, as outcomes of societal values, and as self-
constructed social systems - they offer exciting arenas for academic debates as well as they 
also provide pragmatic or architectonic principles.  
    The agenda is far from having reached maturity. Major issues remain open to verification 
and debate. Some empirical phenomena are still open to further research. This is clearly the 
case, for instance, for international organizations (Schemeil, 2011) and for supra-national 
polities (March and Olsen, 1998; Olsen 2010). Methodological progress is still required: for 
instance, a less allusive set of evidence to trace relationships between cognitions and actions, 
or a in-depth understanding of the collateral effects generated by administrative reforms. 
Reconciling  performance  requirements  with  political  support  by  public  opinion,  making 
production  of  regulations  and  norms  compatible  with  democratic  pluralism,  remain  in 
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